King Jeongjo is dead, his reforms are on life support, and the woman holding the throne is making moves that will shape Korean politics for the next century. This episode covers the regency of Queen Dowager Jeongsun, the brief window of slave emancipation and anti-discrimination reform, and the rise of the Andong Kim clan — the family that turned “marrying into the monarchy” into a full-contact governing strategy.
Join our Patreon to get more stuff
https://patreon.com/darksideofseoul
Book a tour of The Dark Side of Seoul Ghost Walk at https://darksideofseoul.com
Credits
Produced by Joe McPherson and Shawn Morrissey
Music by Soraksan
Top Tier Patrons
Angel Earl
Joel Bonomini
Devon Hiphner
Gabi Palomino
Steve Marsh
Eva Sikora
Hunter Winter
Cecilia Löfgren Dumas
Ashley Wright
Edward Bradford
Boram Yoon
Chad Struhs
Stewart MacMillan
Louise Dreisig

The Year Joseon Almost Reformed Itself
King Jeongjo died in the summer of 1800, and within about six months, his successor had burned most of what he’d built.
That’s not entirely accurate, but it’s how it felt to anyone who’d been paying attention. Jeongjo had spent twenty-four years threading an impossible needle — using the Gyujanggak Royal Library as a brain trust, cultivating a practical-learning movement called silhak, playing the Byeokpa and Sipha court factions against each other with enough skill to keep either from getting too comfortable. He’d modernized the military, protected the persecuted, and at least partially shielded Korea’s growing Catholic community from the worst impulses of the Confucian orthodoxy. When he died, he was fifty-two years old, and the throne passed to his eight-year-old son.
The boy who became King Sunjo had no real power, which meant someone else had to hold things together. That someone was Queen Dowager Jeongsun — the widow of King Yeongjo, Jeongjo’s grandfather, which made her Sunjo’s great-grandmother by marriage and placed her at the top of the court hierarchy. She was also a member of the Gyeongju Kim clan, politically positioned well to the right of anything Jeongjo had stood for, and she had been waiting a very long time.
She moved fast. The Catholic persecution that had been building since 1791 became a full crackdown in 1801. Hundreds of Korean Catholics and foreign missionaries were executed. Jeongjo’s careful management of that particular crisis — keeping the violence contained, maintaining plausible deniability, protecting at least some of his reformist allies — was over. The Sipha faction that had supported him was out. The Byeokpa conservatives were in.
And then, almost immediately, Jeongsun did something that surprised everyone.
The Slaves-and-Bastards Reform
In January 1801, the regency government issued an edict freeing 66,067 government-owned slaves. This was not a small number. Joseon’s slave system had existed in various forms since the early dynasty, and the nobi — the enslaved class — had at various points accounted for somewhere between a third and nearly half the total population. The scale had shrunk considerably by 1801, but freeing tens of thousands of people in a single decree was still a significant act.
The limitations were equally significant. “Government-owned slaves” meant exactly that. Private slavery — slaves owned by yangban aristocratic families, by temples, by institutions — was untouched. The reform freed the people the state had directly owned; it did not touch the people that powerful families had owned for generations. Whether this was a principled half-measure or a pragmatic concession to the elite families whose cooperation Jeongsun needed is probably not a distinction that mattered much to the people it didn’t apply to.
The second reform was more conceptually ambitious and practically even more constrained. Also in 1801, the regency changed the law governing who could sit the gwageo — the civil service examination that was, in theory, the primary path to official government positions and, by extension, to everything that went with them: income, status, protection, the ability to participate in the apparatus of the state. Previously, men born out of wedlock were excluded entirely. The 1801 law opened the examination to them.
The gwageo had been the formal gatekeeping mechanism of Joseon’s ruling class since the dynasty’s founding, and in practice it went back further than that — the exam system itself was inherited from the Goryeo dynasty, where it had already developed the same pathologies it carried into Joseon. Legacy mattered. Connections mattered. The best teachers, the best study materials, the informal networks of preparation and mentorship — all of these clustered around established yangban families in the capital and in a handful of historically powerful regional centers. A rural candidate sitting the exam against someone whose family had been running the bureaucracy for five generations was not competing on equal terms, regardless of what the rules said.
Opening the examination to those born out of wedlock was, in principle, a meaningful change. In practice, the establishment simply refused to recognize the results. The resistance was sufficient that the 1801 reform essentially sat on paper for more than two decades. It took a formal petition from literati in 1823 — twenty-two years later — to produce anything resembling actual implementation. Which raises the question of what “reform” means when the institutions being reformed have enough structural power to ignore what they don’t like.
The Examination Nobody Could Actually Pass
The gwageo’s corruption wasn’t a secret. It was practically a feature. Elite families in Seoul and in places like Andong had been gaming the examination system for so long that the gaming had become the system. There were informal quotas that benefited established clans. There were networks of recommendation that functioned like legacy admissions at universities — the official rules said one thing; the unofficial practice said another. The gap between what a well-connected candidate in the capital could access and what a talented but unconnected candidate in the provinces could access had been widening for generations.
This had consequences that compound over time. The bureaucracy produced by this system was, by definition, a bureaucracy staffed primarily by people whose families already ran the bureaucracy. Fresh thinking was not particularly welcome. Practical expertise — the kind that the silhak scholars were trying to cultivate — was actively devalued. A government that selects for itself, from among itself, across enough generations will eventually stop being able to do anything except govern itself, which is a different activity than governing a country.
The 1801 reforms gestured at this problem without doing anything serious about the structural conditions that created it. You could now, technically, take the exam regardless of your birth circumstances. What you could not do was change the fact that everyone who graded the exam and controlled advancement through the bureaucracy came from the families that had always controlled those things.
The Andong Kims Arrive
The family that would come to define the next century of Joseon politics had been powerful for a long time before they became dominant. The Andong Kims traced their lineage back to the Goryeo dynasty, and in the city of Andong — a historic center in North Gyeongsang Province, about three hours southeast of Seoul — three major clan shrines still stand today, monuments to families who have been important in Korean government and business for somewhere in the vicinity of a thousand years. They are not subtle about it.
Queen Dowager Jeongsun needed allies, and the Andong Kims were available. She appointed Kim Gwang-ju of the Gyeongju Kims to multiple ministerial positions, but the more consequential alliance was with the Andong branch. When King Sunjo reached the appropriate age for marriage, he was matched with the daughter of Kim Jo-sun, a powerful Andong Kim patriarch. This made Kim Jo-sun the king’s father-in-law, which in the logic of Joseon court politics made him one of the most powerful men in the country, and made his extended family a quasi-governmental institution.
The practice has a name: sedo jeongchi. Literally something like “in-law governance” or “powerful family politics,” it describes the system by which the family of the queen — and specifically the queen’s father’s family — effectively ran the government while the king occupied the throne in a more ceremonial capacity. The king was still the king. He could still be appealed to, still issued edicts, still performed the rituals. But the real decisions — appointments, dismissals, policy, the daily exercise of administrative power — flowed through the in-law family and their networks.
Jeongsun’s regency formally ended in December 1803. By that point, Kim Jo-sun had so thoroughly seeded the government with Andong Kim allies, relatives, clients, and dependents that the transition from regency to nominal royal rule barely changed anything. Sunjo was in charge. The Andong Kims were running things. This arrangement would persist, with brief interruptions and changes of dominant family, for most of the rest of the dynasty.
What Gets Built on a Rotten Foundation
The sequence of events from 1800 to 1803 is, in retrospect, clarifying. Jeongjo’s reform program was not killed by a single act of counter-revolution. It was dismantled piece by piece while the official record showed it being replaced, in some cases, by reforms that looked more radical than anything Jeongjo had attempted. Freeing tens of thousands of slaves sounds, on paper, more dramatic than anything on Jeongjo’s agenda. Opening the civil service examination to a previously excluded class sounds progressive. What it was, structurally, was a set of concessions that didn’t threaten anyone who actually mattered — while the networks, appointments, and institutional arrangements that made genuine change possible were quietly disassembled.
The gwageo was left intact. Private slavery was left intact. The Gyujanggak’s influence was curtailed. The silhak scholars who had provided the intellectual infrastructure for reform were sidelined. The factions that had competed to keep the court from being captured by any single clan were replaced by a system explicitly designed for capture. All of this happened in about thirty-six months.
The frustration that built up over the following decades — among people locked out of the exam system, among communities exhausted by elite extraction, among religious communities that found official Confucianism increasingly hollow — eventually found expression in the Donghak movement, the grassroots religious and political uprising that would become one of the defining crises of the late Joseon period. The line from 1801 to Donghak is not a straight one, but it runs through the same terrain: a ruling system that had perfected the mechanics of its own reproduction while losing the capacity to do anything else.
The Andong Kims are still in Andong. The shrines are still there. The families are still, in various ways, prominent. History, in Korea as elsewhere, has a long memory for these things.






